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ABSTRACT 
Almost all studies conducted on network economy and the 
Internet identify ‘security’ as a major concern for businesses. In 
general, the level of security in any network environment is 
closely linked to the level of trust assigned to a particular 
individual or organization within that environment. It is the trust 
element that is crucial in ensuring a secure environment. Besides 
physical security, security technology needs to be utilised to 
provide a trusted environment for e-business. Network security 
components for perimeter defense, i.e., Virtual Private Networks, 
firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems, need to be 
complemented by security components at the applications and 
user level, e.g., authentication of user. ID or password security 
solution may be an option but now with the availability of 
legally binding digital certificates, security in e-business 
transactions can be further improved. Time and date stamping of 
e-business transactions are also of concern to prove at a later 
date that the transactions took place at the stipulated date and 
time. Digital certificates are part of a Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) scheme, which is an enabling technology for building a 
trusted epvironment. PIU comprise policies and procedures for 
establishing a secure method for exchanging information over a 
network environment. The Digital Signature Act 1997 (DSA 
1997) facilitates the PKI implementation in Malaysia. Following 
the DSA 1997, Certification Authorities (CAs) were set up in 
Malaysia. This paper describes a trusted platform for spurring e- 
business and provides a Malaysian perspective of it. 
Key words: Public key infrastructure, Digital certificates, Information security, 
E-business 
33 
Journal of ICT, 1(1), pp: 33-44 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
he Internet has bequeathed organisations with opportunities to improve 
their business processes, target and expand new markets, create business T strategies and increase customer satisfaction. However, failure in 
providing a secure Internet connection may cause financial loss, lost of business 
opportunities, a tarnished image for service and loss of customer confidence. To 
participate and to capitalize on the potential of the Internet, having a trusted 
electronic environment is of vital importance. 
For e-sovereignty to exist a trusted environment must be built that will be able 
to address the issue of information security over an electronic medium. 
Basically, three main components need to exist for secure communications 
(Ford and Baum, 1997): 
(i) Assurance of the identities of transacting parties 
(ii) Confidentiality and integrity of information transacted 
(iii) Irrefutability by the transacting parties 
Besides physical security, stringent security measures need to be put in place. 
Network security components for perimeter defense, i.e., Virtual Private 
Networks, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems, need to be complemented 
by security components at the applications and user level, e.g., authentication of 
user. ID or password security solution might be an option but can easily be 
breached, e.g., through brute force techniques. Public Key Cryptography is one 
of the latest security technologies to offer the level of security required for 
electronic transactions. 
A Public Key Infiastructure (PKI) supports public key cryptography services 
where a PKI, comprising policies and procedures for efficient key and 
certificate management in establishing a secure method for exchanging 
, information over a network within an organisation, an industry, a nation or 
worldwide, exist (PKIX, 2002). The Digital Signature Act 1977 (DSA, 1997) 
facilitates theimplementation of PKI in Malaysia. 
2.0 INFORMATION SECURITY 
E-business information must be protected both in storage and in transit over the 
computer telecommunications network. A governing security policy must exist 
which involves identifying proprietary information and identifLing who is 
allowed to access the information (Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994). Employees 
need to be advised of threats, countermeasures and their responsibilities in 
safeguarding information (Forcht, 1994). To uphold the governing security 
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policy, a combination of safeguards in access controls, authentication, 
encryption and intrusiodmisuse detection are required (Ali Yusny and Mohd 
Aizaini, 200 1). Access controls, which include computer and network login 
controls, firewalls and application layer controls, are essential to prevent 
unauthorised access to information resources. 
Authentication mechanism on the other hand validates the identity of users and 
other entities including networked computers. Mechanisms include passwords, 
biometrics, cryptography and digital signatures. Encryption can protect data 
transmitted over open computer networks and phone lines as well as protect 
data stored in computers. 
Intrusion and misuse detection can be checked through monitoring system 
behavior, either from audit records or in real time. Software tools are available 
to detect and eradicate viruses, worms and trojan horses which can be viewed as 
intrusion detectors. Known vulnerabilities on systems should be addressed, i.e., 
properly configured and maintained, since intruders will normally exploit these 
vulnerabilities. 
Another component that adds legitimacy and security to e-business transactions 
is date and time stamping. Digital date and time stamping is required in order to 
establish and provide evidence as to when an e-business event has occurred, as 
evident in Datum (2002) and Merill (1999). 
PKI is able to provide some of the above safeguards to help organisations 
improve security in their electronic communications environment. PKI has the 
capacity to safeguard authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation 
in transactions (Ford and Baum, 1997). 
PKI technology can also be used to authenticate timing devices within a secure 
hierarchy of clocks and time stamp servers by providing the following three 
attributes, as discussed in Datum (2002): 
i. 
ii. 
111. 
Assurance that the time came from an official source 
Assurance that time has not been manipulated 
An evidentiary trail for auditing or non-repudiation. ... 
3.0 THE PKI FRAMEWORK 
PKI is an enabling technology for building a trusted environment. PIU uses 
asymmetrical encryption technology where a widely available key known as the 
public key is used to encrypt a message. A different key, known as the private 
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key is used to decrypt the message. The private key can also be used to create 
digital signatures. The private key never leaves the domain of the bearer. PIU 
enables secure communication between large numbers of users. 
The security features found in the public key algorithm as outlined by Stallings 
(1998) are: 
Authentication. One signs (using the private key) a random generated 
message/numbers and sends the original messagehumbers together with 
the certificate (public key). The recipient can verify that the message is 
signed by the sender's private key. Since only the sender has the private 
key, he must be who he claims he is. 
Encryption (Confidentiality and Integrity). Encryption is usually achieved 
by using the recipient's public key to encrypt a message. Since only the 
recipient has the corresponding private key, the message is safe and 
cannot be read by others. 
Non-repudiation. When a person signs a message using hisher private 
key, every one can verify the signature with his public key. Since only he 
could have his private key, he cannot deny signing the message. 
PIU incorporating Smart Card and Secure Socket Layer technologies provide an 
end-to-end solution for building a trusted electronic environment for e-business 
transactions. A description of the components that are associated with PIU is 
given below. 
3.1 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is an electronic rather than a written signature that can be used 
by someone to authenticate the identity of the sender of the message or the 
signer o'f a document. It can also be used to ensure that the original content of 
the message conveyed is unchanged. 
Digital Signature assures message, document or form recipients that the 
originator is really who he or she says he/she is. Each individual who wants to 
transact andor participate in the Digital Signature processes must be fully and 
uniquely identified and authenticated. There should be little possibility of 
impersonation. Each user will be uniquely identified or authenticated by a 
digital ID sometimes known as Certificates. 
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policy, a combination of safeguards in access controls, authentication, 
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key is used to decrypt the message. The private key can also be used to create 
digital signatures. The private key never leaves the domain of the bearer. PIU 
enables secure communication between large numbers of users. 
The security features found in the public key algorithm as outlined by Stallings 
(1 998) are: 
Authentication. One signs (using the private key) a random generated 
message/numbers and sends the original messagehumbers together with 
the certificate (public key). The recipient can verify that the message is 
signed by the sender’s private key. Since only the sender has the private 
key, he must be who he claims he is. 
Encryption (Confidentiality and Integrity). Encryption is usually achieved 
by using the recipient’s public key to encrypt a message. Since only the 
recipient has the corresponding private key, the message is safe and 
cannot be read by others. 
Non-repudiation. When a person signs a message using hisher private 
key, every one can verify the signature with his public key. Since only he 
could have his private key, he cannot deny signing the message. 
PKI incorporating Smart Card and Secure Socket Layer technologies provide an 
end-to-end solution for building a trusted electronic environment for e-business 
transactions. A description of the components that are associated with PKI is 
given below. 
3.1 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is an electronic rather than a written signature that can be used 
by someone to authenticate the identity of the sender of the message or the 
signer o€ a document. It can also be used to ensure that the original content of 
the message conveyed is unchanged. 
Digital Signature assures message, document or form recipients that the 
originator is really who he or she says he/she is. Each individual who wants to 
transact and/or participate in the Digital Signature processes must be fully and 
uniquely identified and authenticated. There should be little possibility of 
impersonation. Each user will be uniquely identified or authenticated by a 
digital ID sometimes known as Certificates. 
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3.2 Smart Cards 
Smart cards carry an embedded microchip that stores data and applications and 
in a PKI implementation is used to securely store the digital certificate and key 
pair (Verisign White Paper, 2001). Smart cards provide a trusted platform that 
can keep secret keys and cannot be corrupted by viruses or non-authorised 
software. The smart card requires a PIN for access to the user's credentials, 
which is an added layer of protection if the smart card itself is lost or stolen. 
Smart cards can be used as a digital identity. With PKI the card can be used to 
enable secure logon, secure e-mail, secure access to proprietary and confidential 
web sites, or single sign-on to Intranets. Multiple applications can reside on a 
single smart card, and applications can be added, deleted, or upgraded without 
reissuing the card. 
3.3 Certification Authority 
A certification authority (CA) is a trusted source that issues and signs digital 
certificates. In Malaysia there are currently two CAs, i.e., Digicert Sdn Bhd 
(Digicert, 2001), the first national CA established in 1998 and Msctrustgate 
Sdn Bhd. (Msctrustgate, 2001) in 1999. A digital certificate comprises the 
bearer's public key, digital signature, owner identity, serial number, issuant and 
expiration date. The purpose of a digital certificate is to provide the bearer with 
a credential. CA creates, signs and issues digital certificates. 
The role of a CA is to certify the veracity and the integrity of the relationship 
between a public key and the identity of the associated user. The certification 
processes result in a digital certificate that is used to authenticate and provide 
irrefutable evidence of an electronic transaction. The verification done by a CA 
is known as the trusted third party. The public key is a half of key pair, where 
the other half of the key (Private Key) is kept by the owner. The CA stores the 
public key in' a certificate, which is then signed by the CA as the valid public 
key. The certificate will be kept in a X.500 directory. 
' 
A CA will also maintain the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). A CRL is a list 
of certificates, which for one reason or another have been revoked before their 
scheduled expiration date. Ths  may be because the private key has been lost or 
its security has been compromised. A certificate may also be placed on the CRL 
if it was issued to a person in an official capacity, which is no longer held. 
The process of issuing a certificate requires a high degree of security, 
comparable to the process of issuing a passport. The CA will authenticate the 
user and will require proof on the user's identity. Once the user's application 
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has been accepted a key pair (PublicPrivate) will be generated and the CA will 
issue and sign a certificate linking the public key to its owner. 
Registration authorities ( U s )  are elected by CAs to authenticate users based on 
a set of policies. Cross certification between CAs would enable broader 
acceptance of the digital certificates from various CAs in business transactions. 
A CA in Malaysia has to be licensed by the Controller of Certification 
Authorities in the Ministry of Energy, Communications and Multimedia. 
3.4 Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
SSL is a link level protocol that supports server authentication. The SSL 
protocol is able to negotiate encryption keys as well as authenticate the server 
before data is exchanged by higher level applications. SSL is the industry- 
standard protocol for secure Web-based communications (Netscape, 200 1). 
SSL encrypts all information exchanged between a Web server and a Web 
browser. This will help avoid hackers from viewing the confidential 
information. When a message is transmitted over the network, the sending and 
receiving computers each generate a unique code based on the message content. 
If a single character in the message content is altered or changed during 
transmission, the receiving computer will generate a different code, and then 
alert the recipient that the message has been tampered with. 
4.0 PIU DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA 
Malaysia has spanned the entire range of issues associated with the legal effect 
of electronic signatures, the legal framework for the operation of PKI and the 
establishment of a regulatory body to oversee CAs. Under the requirement of 
the DSA (1997), the Government is required to establish the controller of CAs, 
and this has been made in October 1997. The function of this regulatory body is 
to oversee the establishments and operations of CAs through yearly audit and 
monthly reporting. 
Table 1 shows the licensed CAs, RAs and cross-certification effort in Malaysia 
to date (Nooritawati, Norashidah and Md Zaini ,2001). 
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Table 1: PKI Service in Malaysia 
Cross 
Recognition 
(Certification) 
Certificate Digicert Sdn Bhd 
Authority 
MSC Trustgate 
Digicert and Hong Kong Post CA and 
Singapore Post CA 
I 
Registration Pos Malaysia 
Authority 
Mimos 
GITN Sdn Bhd 
Sarawak Information System Sdn Bhd 
KKIP Communications Sdn Bhd (Sabah) 
1998 
1999 
1998 
1998 
1999 
2000 
200 1 
2000 
Initiatives by the government to promote PIU usage can be seen in the e- 
Government project, i.e., Electronic Procurement and Generic Office 
Environment. In the electronic procurement project, new vendors and vendors 
renewing their licenses are given two sets of smart cards which contain 
‘certificates and key pairs to perform on-line and real-time transactions with the 
Government. This will streamline the procurement processes and procedures as 
well as imprche efficiency and productivity. The procurement application, 
known as e-Perolehan, will require the user to use their e-Perolehan ID Card, 
which uses a microprocessor smart card, for identification, authentication and 
verification by the system. The smart card will be storing user profile for each 
appointed and authorised user and also a Digital Certificate issued by Malaysian 
Government Licensed Certificate Authority (CA). Only certificates issued by 
the recognized CA will be used for e-Perolehan. By using the Digital 
Certificate, all transactions will be considered as legal and valid and every data 
transaction will be encrypted using 128-bit encryption technology (CDC, 2002). 
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The MSC’s Government Multipurpose Card (GMPC) flagship project will 
embed a PKI component on the card that will facilitate e-commerce and e- 
business transactions. The GMPC card or now known as MyKad is a smart card 
that can have multiple-hnctions for multiple-applications (GMPC, 2002). 
4.1 A National Agenda : The Way Forward 
E-business in the borderless world will inevitably need to achieve the degree of 
trust required for types of applications implemented. Else the transacting 
environment might face possible impersonations of identities and manoeuvring 
of information in the midst of conducting businesses. Confidence level for 
doing e-business will not be there, and e-business will be a disaster. 
PKI technology is recognized by governments world wide. Argentina, 
Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Russia and Singapore have enacted legislations 
regarding digital signatures, and many other countries, such as Australia, the 
United Kingdom and United States have made official studies and proposed 
legislative initiatives. 
PKI is still in its infancy in Malaysia as it is in the rest of the world. However, 
the seriousness of the government is lauded by being one of the first countries 
in the world to enact legislation on digital signature. In Malaysia, PKI solutions 
have a firm footing as compared to other technologies in offering secure 
communication since the digital signature legislation is behind it. 
In line with the legislative efforts in Malaysia, PIU technology looks set to be 
the solution for a trusted e-business environment. With PKI, businesses have the 
backing of the enacted law. However, PKI is an infrastructure and as such is 
only worth as much as the applications that can operate within its framework. 
Efforts on developing PKI based applications are required. Examples of 
applications that can be used for PKI implementations include e-mail, 
messaging, on-line services for B2C and B2B e-commerce. 
\ 
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4.1. 1 Issues related to PKI implementation 
Movements towards establishing standards between PKIs in Malaysia need also 
take consideration of PKIs in Asia and the rest of the world so that the use of 
PKI can be capitalised across the borderless internetworking world. A 
technological barrier that needs to be overcome is the interoperability between 
PUS. PKIs are semi-proprietary in their standards and basic infrastruture, e.g., 
one PIU implementation can have multiple roots and another can have a single 
root. In Malaysia, for instance, Digicert Sdn. Bhd. and MSC Trustgate.com are 
using different technology in their PKI implementations. Digicert operates 
using a single root where this root is maintained by Digicert in Malaysia while 
Msctrustgate is having their root signed by Verisign, Inc. located in 
Mountainview, USA. An additional concern is that PKI standards have yet to be 
established to enable multiple PKIs to interoperate and multiple applications to 
interface with a single PKI. 
Another technological barrier is that the Internet standards and formats in PKI 
are considered too heavy for mobile implementation with low processor and 
memory capacity. The X.509, which is the standard certificate format, is too 
large to send over the air (500 bytes to 1K) and users may have to end up with, 
large storage requirements if several certificates are required. However, if a new 
format is used, incompatibility with the existing wired PKIs will arise and wired 
and wireless users will have separate PKIs. The CAs in Malaysia have yet to 
announce any wireless specific services. Elsewhere in Asia, movements towards 
establishing a wireless PKI standard can be seen such as in Korea and the 
formation of the Asian PKI Forum (Report of PIU Forum, 2001). 
Issues of time stamps for e-business transactions need to be addressed. The 
digital date and time stamps framework and implementation must be able to 
stand up in the Malaysian court of law. 
' 
E-sovereignty implicates national security and foreign involvement needs to be 
checked. In the wake of September 11, 2001 tragedy, United States lawmakers 
are calling \for laws that will make it easier to crack encrypted messages by 
creating a "back door" in their encryption products. Furthermore some 
countries, e.g., Canada and the US, control exports of encryption programs on 
the basis of foreign hostile organizations and governments using it to 
communicate secretly. This can be seen in the Wassenaar Arrangement 
(Wassenaar, 1995), where export restrictions have been imposed on strong 
cryptographic software. 
Having a foreign CA might jeopardise national security. One policy under 
debate in the US is mandatory key recovery where law-enforcement and 
intelligence agencies would hold keys for decrypting any electronic 
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communication. Licensed local CAs should be in control of the technology, 
e.g., management of the PIU key pairs, in order to avoid undercover 
surveillance and foreign elements in the PIU enabling products. 
5.0 DISCUSSION 
The government and the private sectors need to work together to address legal, 
trade control and security-related issues that may be impeding the use of e- 
business. 
To facilitate the demand for PIU based applications, skill sets pertaining to PIU 
systems integration and maintenance need to be developed. Courses related to 
computer security and PIU need to be established and expanded in institutions 
of higher learning to support the e-business development. Research and 
development activities should address PIU related issues so as to ready and 
propel Malaysia into the e-business scene. The government’s Multimedia Super 
Corridor flagship applications, for instance, can be a catalyst to the promotion 
of a trusted environment in e-business applications to make them reliable world 
class show case applications. To this end the Malaysian government can play a 
leadership role by ensuring that a legally trusted environment is a feature of 
their pilot applications 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
Transacting in the borderless cyber-world requires safeguards. PIU is seen as a 
technology that could play a part in establishing e-sovereignty, i.e., secure 
transactions over the internetworking-computing environment. PIU provides 
security in the form of authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non- 
repudiation. PIU are recognized by governments world wide and given 
consideration in their legislative initiatives and supported legally in Malaysia. 
Without a trusted environment electronic transactions may be obscure and 
suspect. In order to unlock the Internet economic potential and not lose out in 
the borderless digital economy, Malaysian businesses would need to plunge into 
e-business. Organizations can employ PIU according to their e-business needs. 
A national agenda should include forums to promote the awareness of the 
security technology available, besides addressing the issues involved in 
implementing and improving the technology. 
\ 
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